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The economic analysis of tort law is extended to multi-party accidents with unobservable
actions. Due to the requirement of no punitive damages, the problem resembles a team
production problem. It is shown that asymmetry in the agents’ impact on the stochastic
damage function can be exploited to improve ex ante incentives. This implies departures from
the proportional rule, based on the statistical information contained in the circumstances
of the accident. If a noisy monitoring technology is introduced, then monitoring can add
enough stochastic identiﬁability among injurers so as to restore eﬃciency.
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Multi-party accidents are in theory and practice an important problem for the design of
eﬃcient liability rules. By multi-party accidents (or, synonymously, by multiple causation)
we mean that harm has been generated by the actions of several agents whose contributions
are non-separable. The present paper extends the economic analysis of tort law to multiple
causation with unobservable actions.1
There is a substantial body of literature showing that multiple causation does not consti-
tute a serious obstacle to eﬃciency as long as the court is fully informed about the circum-
stances of an accident.2 The case of a bilateral accident where the injurer’s and the victim’s
activities both have an impact on the expected damage is the best illustration.3 Granted
that the liability rule will suﬃciently penalize the parties for any deviation from the optimal
levels of care, eﬃciency will be obtained. It is well known that negligence rules as well as
rules of strict liability with contributory negligence will satisfy this condition and implement
due care standards at the ﬁr s tb e s tl e v e l .
The most detailed contribution on multi-party accidents is due to Lewis Kornhauser
and Richard Revesz. In a series of articles, they undertake a comprehensive analysis of the
problem, by focusing on detailed comparisons of diﬀerent sharing rules (and their eﬃciency
impacts). Their papers are primarily motivated by the disposal of hazardous waste and
questions raised by the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liabil-
ity Act (CERCLA).4 They provide important taxonomies of diﬀerent rules of apportionment
(Kornhauser and Revesz [1989])5 and extend their analysis to potentially insolvent ac-
tors (Kornhauser and Revesz [1990]) and the eﬀects of settlements (Kornhauser and
Revesz [1994a],[1994b]).
By contrast, only very few contributions have examined problems of asymmetric infor-
mation. These articles all focus on situations of hidden information (adverse selection) with
respect to avoidance costs. Building on the well-known results for the single injurer-case,
Kornhauser and Revesz also analyze the situation of uncertainty about the optimal care
1We will henceforth call injurers’ actions care levels. In formal terms, our analysis applies equally well to
care levels as to activity levels, as long as there is a problem of observability.
2See e.g. Landes and Posner [1980], Landes and Posner [1987, 199 ﬀ.], Shavell [1987, 164-167],
Kornhauser and Revesz [1989].
3It is straightforward to show that bilateral accidents are a special case of multicausal damages for which
t h es a m el o g i ca p p l i e s .
442 U.S.C. §§9601-9675 [1982] & Supp.IV 1986.
5By distinguishing, in particular, between rules of (a) full liability versus partial liability, (b) unitary
share versus fractional share and (c) ﬁxed share versus proportional share.
1levels.6 Emons and Sobel [1991] and Feess and Hege [1997] show that eﬃciency can
considerably be increased by applying Bayesian mechanisms.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze multi-party accidents with unobservable activity
or care levels (moral hazard). Our paper is, to the best of our knowledge, the ﬁrst analysis
explicitly addressing the moral hazard problem.7 As in Kornhauser and Revesz, our work
is motivated by environmental problems like the disposal of hazardous waste. Imagine a
situation in which several agents deposit their wastes on a single landﬁll. Furthermore, the
time lag between the dumping and the occurrence of environmental harm may be long. It
may then be impossible or at least uneconomically expensive to ﬁgure out which manufac-
turer has dumped what amount of hazardous waste.8 This analysis is not only relevant for
environmental problems. Other typical examples are mass collisions on highways where ac-
tions can neither be observed ex ante nor fully reconstructed ex post. Also, law suits against
partnerships (e.g. against consultants or accountants) can be interpreted as multi-party
“accidents”.
Designing an eﬃcient liability rule for multi-party accidents would be a trivial task even
with unobservable actions if punitive damages were not excluded. If there is a single injurer,
exclusion of punitive damages means that the compensation must not exceed the harm.
Extended to multiple injurers, it must mean that none of the injurers and no subgroup of
injurers pay punitive damages. To see that it would be easy indeed to design an eﬃcient
liability rule including punitive damages, let us recall the basic idea of strict liability in the
single-injurer case: under strict liability, the injurer will always pay for the total damage,
which obviously leads her to choose the eﬃcient care levels. This is because by maximizing
her individual utility, the injurer faces the same loss function that any decision maker maxi-
mizing social welfare would face. So the injurer’s optimal marginal utility will coincide with
the optimal marginal social welfare. Translating this idea into a multi-injurer framework
obviously suggests the following liability rule which Finsinger and Pauly [1990] call the
“double liability rule”: each injurer should individually pay for the total damage. Clearly,
the resulting care levels will be eﬃcient. The beauty and simplicity of such an arrangement
6See Kornhauser and Revesz [1989, 863-870.]
7Kornhauser and Revesz point out that their liability rule would be able to cope with moral hazard
because damages are apportioned independent of action levels, but they do not investigate whether their
liability rule is the best possible in a moral hazard environment. This question is investigated in the current
paper.
8Mechanisms where only aggregate emissions are observable are examined in Meran and Schwalbe
[1987], Xepapadeas [1991] and Kritikos [1993]. Their basic idea is to use penalties whenever aggregate
emissions exceed the predeﬁned critical level. Thus, payments are based on emissions, not, as in our model,
on harm.
2has led many economists to argue (indirectly) in favor of relaxing the no punitive damages
condition.9
However, we do not follow this approach since in tort systems all over the world, punitive
damages are restricted to cases of reckless conduct, e.g. drunken driving.10 Exceptions seem
to be most common in the United States.11 Several US States are now imposing levies on
punitive damages awards. We are not aware of tendencies towards relinquishing no punitive
damages outside the United States. And even in the US, there is now a clear tendency
to limit the use of punitive damages, heralded by recent product liability law suits.12 The
present paper therefore strictly excludes the use of punitive damages.
The fundamental dilemma can then be described as follows.13 On the one hand, holding
each injurer liable for the total damage must inevitably lead to punitive damages: with n
injurers and total harm x, punitive damages of (n−1)·x will be collected. On the other hand,
if each injurer i pays only a fraction of the total harm, then care levels will be ineﬃciently
low since each injurer will only take a part of total harm into consideration.
The problem of designing a non-punitive and eﬃcient liability rule becomes transparent if
multi-party accidents are interpreted as team production problems or partnership problems.
In a team production problem, several “partners” join forces to obtain an output described
by a joint output function, but neither they nor a principal or social planner can observe the
actions. So rewards and punishments can only be levied in reaction to the observable joint
output, not conditional on the (unobservable) individual contributions. In addition, rewards
and punishments are restricted by budget-balancing ex post which is a condition commanding
that they sum up to the total joint output. But now interpret the joint output function as the
joint damage function describing the prior accident risks of multiple injurers, and interpret
the output as the actual accident loss (in monetary terms) which occurs. Then the analogy
should be clear. More precisely, because accidents are outcomes which are uncertain ex ante,
a team production model with a stochastic joint output function must be considered.
Holmstr¨ om [1982] started the literature on team production problems by analyzing
partnerships among symmetric and risk-neutral partners (symmetry means here that the im-
pact on the joint production function is symmetric). He shows a fundamental non-existence
9See e.g. Polinsky and Che [1991].
10See e.g. Shavell [1987, 146].
11However, Landes and Posner [1987, 304] report that even in product liability lawsuits, punitive dam-
ages have been used in less than ﬁve percent of all successful suits. Also, there seems to be no correlation
with multiple causation. Other studies ﬁnd a more frequent use of punitive damages.
12See the 1996 Supreme Court decision in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore 116 S.Ct.1589, 134 L.Ed.
2d 809 (1996).
13See e.g. Shavell [1987, 177].
3result: an eﬃcient sharing rule respecting budget-balancing ex post does not exist. Now
budget-balancing ex post is a strictly weaker condition than no punitive damages (under
budget-balancing ex post, subsidies to some partners are admissible while under punitive
damages, they must be ruled out). So if a balanced liability rule does not exist, then a
rule without punitive damages will not exist, either. Since then, various modiﬁcations and
extensions of Holmstr¨ om’s model have been suggested which give rise to more encouraging
results. For our purposes, the single most important of these contributions is due to Legros
and Matsushima [1991]. They consider the stochastic team production problem and intro-
duce asymmetry among agents. They derive conditions for the existence of eﬃcient sharing
rules and show that asymmetry among agents alleviates the task considerably. Also, the
conditions found for existence are not only suﬃcient, but also necessary.
The contribution of Legros and Matsushima is important for the present paper because
in multi-party accidents, defendants have frequently an asymmetric impact on the joint
damage function. To see this, consider again the example of hazardous wastes dumping. It
is fairly unlikely that, on a waste site, the size or the composition of all injurers’ deposits
should be absolutely homogeneous, and that the court should have no clue as to the likely
diﬀerences among injurers. For example, just the easily observable industrial activities of
the defendants give substantial, albeit imprecise, hints as to the heterogeneity of possible
deposits. It seems natural to assume that the court gets at least some inaccurate information
of the potential waste disposal of the various injurers, i.e. which injurer has access to
what sort of hazardous waste. It remains however an important scope of uncertainty about
the quantities (the “activity levels”) of toxic wastes contained in various injurers’ deposits
(hence unobservability of activities). This is the situation we have in mind in the present
paper. Thus, we investigate under what circumstances eﬃcient liability rules for multi-party
accidents can be found, given that punitive damages are excluded and injurers have (most
likely) an asymmetric impact on the accident.
Our analysis restricts attention exclusively to strict liability meaning that the total loss
is always paid in full by the injurers.14 An important reason for this is that it is not at all
clear how negligence standards can be deﬁned if care levels are unobservable.
We propose a liability rule based on the idea that asymmetries between injurers can be
exploited. Loosely speaking, asymmetry means that deviations of the injurers from their
ﬁrst best care levels have a distinct impact on the probability distribution function over
outcomes. We show that the power of incentives can be increased in this case and that the
liability rule may be eﬃcient if each injurer has to pay a disproportionate share of those
14Strict liability is the equivalent to budget-balancing ex post in the team production literature.
4outcomes which were more likely her fault than the fault of others, in the sense that if the
defendant in question was less careful than she should have been, than the probability for
the accident outcome has risen more than it would have if another injurer had been less
careful. By applying this idea in an optimal way, we ﬁnd, roughly speaking, that eﬃcient
liability rules exist as long as the asymmetry across injurers is suﬃciently large.
This ﬁnding should be contrasted with the most prominent interpretation of the strict
liability rule in multi-injurer accidents, the proportional rule. The proportional rule or con-
stant splitting rule assumes that each injurer i pays a constant fraction αi of the losses.
Shavell argues that this is “the natural analogue to strict liability in the single-injurer con-
text”(Shavell [1987, 177]). Note that the constant splitting rule would be mostly ineﬃcient
in our model. This is a direct consequence of the team production literature. An important
insight of our paper is precisely that, as long as agents are asymmetric, other liability rules
can do better than the constant splitting rule. Note that there seem to be no juridical ob-
stacles to our proposal to use all available information and to let the division of damages
vary with the level of harm. For example, subsequent claims for contribution can be based
on negligence (and they frequently are).
Shavell’s main motivation to propose the proportional rule is that it can cope with de-
centralized information: the court does not need information on the joint damage function
or individual avoidance costs. While decentralization certainly has many merits, the results
of this paper point to the weak side of decentralization: non-decentralized rules may be
eﬃcient in cases where decentralized are not. While this is well-known for the case of perfect
information, the innovation of the present paper is to give a clear account of the trade-oﬀ
between decentralization and eﬃciency in the context of asymmetric information.
In practical terms, our analysis implies that departures from the constant splitting rule
are recommendable15 whenever injurers could have had an asymmetric impact on the accident
probability. The recommended rule for such departures is the following: only those injurers
who, by their lack of care, could have increased the prior probability for the accident should
pay damages. If some injurers had more discretion to increase the prior probability than
others, than they should assume a disproportionately larger share (and possibly all) of the
losses. In general, one cannot say whether they should pay for all of the losses or only for a
larger share of them because this depends on the speciﬁc joint damage function or probability
distribution in question.16 Both cases are possible.
15Recall that the constant splitting rule cannot be eﬃcient for multi-party accidents. This explains why
we say digressions are recommended.
16We do not conﬁne the analysis to particular probability distributions because we want to derive results
5For the purposes of tort law reform, the recommended liability rule could be phrased
as follows. The liability rule is based on the proportional rule as the default, but gives the
court the discretion to make an individual injurer pay up to the full amount of the losses
rather than a proportional share. Such departure require that (1) such departures be only
permitted for those injurers whose lack of care could have increased the prior probability
of the actual accident and that (2) injurers pay a higher share than those falling in the
ﬁrst category only if their lack of care could have increased the accident probability more
than the lack of care of the other injurers falling in the ﬁrst category. This gives the court
suﬃcient discretion to apportion damages in an eﬃcient way, depending on the circumstances
of the accident (including the joint damage function) and yet permit for a rational agent
to correctly anticipate the apportionment for each of the possible accidents she considers
when choosing her care level. This illustration should convince the reader that our liability
rule would satisfy the rule of law, i.e. the stipulation that the liability rule be universally
applicable and well-known to agents prior to the accident. The idea that a ﬁxed liability
rule leaves room for contingent apportionment is not really diﬀerent from the practice under
the established liability rules: under the negligence rule e.g., the concrete meaning of “due
care” is contingent on the case and must be ﬁx e di ne a c hv e r d i c t .
As an extension, this paper addresses also intermediate cases between pure moral hazard
and perfect information. While pure moral hazard, i.e. the assumption that the injurers’
action are completely unobservable,17 is a useful benchmark, it is certainly not a complete
description of the possibilities. In environmental liability problems for example, some in-
formation about the actions of injurers is often available. The level of emissions can in
principle be monitored, and many emissions (like point source air pollution) are monitored
at the source. Surveillance of potentially harmful activities is costly, however. So naturally,
monitoring tends to be incomplete, or left to random checks. Thus, in the context of accident
law, it seems natural to extend the analysis from moral hazard to include also endogenous
information acquisition. The most interesting extension appears to look at some form of
“noisy monitoring”: the more precise and complete the surveillance, the higher the cost.
For example, assume that the environmental agency chooses the precision of the monitoring
technology and that monitoring costs are increasing in the precision of the signal. The paper
shows that information on a possible deviation should be used swiftly to further increase the
power of incentives, by making the apportionment dependent on the signal obtained from
which are valid in the broadest possible way.
17This does not exclude that the court can retrieve some information on the likely tortfeasor indirectly,
through the statistical posterior that can be constructed from the actual accident. This is what happens in
our model.
6monitoring. If this is done, then very little additional information may be needed to obtain
an eﬃcient liability rule.
Thus, the upshot of our analysis is a strict liability rule which departs from the pro-
portional rule by using all the information available. This result could be interpreted as
exhibiting some similarity with a strict liability rule with contributory negligence. One has
to be careful with this statement because strictly speaking, it is as much unclear how to
apply strict liability with contributory negligence if the care levels are not observable as it is
unclear how to apply the negligence rule. Unobservability does not exclude, however, that
the court uses all statistical information on the behavior of the agents that can be obtained
from the circumstances of the accident. Recall that this is precisely the fundamental idea of
our liability rule: the incentives to choose the ﬁr s tb e s tc a r el e v e l ss t e mf r o mt h ef a c tt h a t
the agents are fully aware that the apportionment of damages will depend on the outcome,
because the latter conveys valuable statistical information on the behavior of the injurers.
It is in this sense that our rule contains elements of contributory negligence. These elements
become even more important if the court can, albeit noisily, gather information on the ac-
tion levels of the injurers. Therefore, the recommendation derived from this paper is that
the liability rule should increasingly emphasize the contributory negligence component as
the precision of the statistical information on the care levels grows.18 I nt h el o g i co fo u r
analysis, it is no surprise that this rule is the one which puts as much incentive power as
possible on any indication of negligence. The crucial remaining diﬀerence to the standard in-
terpretation of strict liability with contributory negligence is that information on negligence
is probabilistic information rather than hard facts.
It should be noted that by focusing on strict liability, we ignore the possibility to exempt
some outcomes from liability, as the negligence rule does. This possibility could potentially
be useful in the context of multiple causation. Looking at this possibility would raise a
host of interesting questions, for example whether low- or high-damage outcomes should
be exempted, whether there should be full or partial exemption and whether the exempted
outcomes form a convex set. Addressing these questions would require a diﬀerent and much
less general model; this is beyond the scope of the present paper.
We emphasize that our analysis relies on the assumption that no other information prob-
lems besides moral hazard are present. This means two assumptions in particular: ﬁrst, the
18Because agents know, when choosing care levels, that the apportionment will depend on the information
contained in the outcome, our liability rule will remind the reader of revelation or Bayesian mechanisms.
Note, however, the diﬀerence: revelation mechanisms typically address adverse selection problems, whereas
team problems deal with moral hazard. For the importance of revelation mechanisms for accident law,
addressing the problem of unobservable avoidance costs, see Feess and Hege [1997].
7avoidance cost functions of all injurers are known (no adverse selection). Second, we tacitly
assume that the court as well as the various injurers know and understand the stochastic
damage function. So problems of information with respect to the links between causes and
eﬀects are ruled out. In environmental liability problems, for example, a major problem is
often to establish suﬃciently hard evidence (even in stochastic terms) between emissions and
their subsequent impact on the environment.
Compared to the literature on the stochastic team production problem19, our analysis
has two main innovative features. First, the application to liability rules requires to look at
state-contingent restrictions. That is to say, no punitive damages implies that the restriction
on aggregate liability payments is diﬀerent for every single accident outcome. This is because
total contributions always add up to the total loss and therefore vary with the level of losses.
By contrast, the restrictions in Legros and Matsushima are constant. Second, the analysis
of endogenous information acquisition (noisy monitoring) in team production is new. On
a minor level, our paper presents a novel explanation for the suﬃciency part of the result.
This approach is very helpful as a tool to partially characterize the eﬃcient rule: only those
injurers should be held liable who could have increased the probability of the actual accident
(compared to the ﬁrst best allocation). A ﬁnal innovation is our limit ineﬃciency result: as
the number of injurers increases, the existence of an eﬃcient rule becomes more and more
precarious.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents the model. Section 3 derives the
existence result for non-punitive liability rules. In section 4, a graphical intuition is given
and the applicable knowledge for the construction of eﬃcient liability rules is collected. A
limit ineﬃciency result is brieﬂy motivated in section 5. Noisy monitoring is introduced in
section 6. We conclude in section 7.
2. The model
There is a ﬁnite set of potential injurers, N = {1,...,n}, each controlling a separate care
level ai ∈ Ai.20 Ai is a ﬁnite set with cardinality Ti: Ai = {a1
i,...,a
Ti
i }. Throughout, all ai
are unobservable. We assume that a
j
i > 0,∀ai ∈ Ai, i.e. the court knows for sure that each
19Besides Legros and Matsushima [1991], notably Legros and Matthews [1993] and Fudenberg,
Levine and Maskin [1994].
20Risk-increasing activities are often diﬀerentiated according to whether the adjudication can be condi-
tioned on them (level of care) or not (activity level). We are exclusively concerned with unobservable actions
which obviously do not lend themselves to conditioning, and hence refer in our model only to a single activity
variable.
8injurer has been responsible for some harmful action.21 While we are looking for liability
rules that implement the ﬁrst best strategy proﬁle in pure strategies, we will have to take
into account the possibility that injurers choose deviations in mixed strategies. Let Mi be
the set of mixed strategies of player i, with a typical element denoted as σi ∈ Mi.D e ﬁne
A = ×i∈NAi, and deﬁne M = ×i∈NMi.
The joint strategy proﬁle a ∈ A induces a stochastic outcome, an aggregate damage or
harm in monetary terms, whose realizations are drawn from the ﬁnite set X = {x1,...,x h,...}.
Actions and harm can be thought of as being multidimensional.22 Each a ∈ A induces a
probability measure p(a)=( p1(a),...,p h(a),...)o v e rX,w h e r eph(a) denotes the probability
that xh is realized when a is the strategy proﬁle. Analogously, we deﬁne p(σ) as the probabil-
ity distribution function when the mixed strategy proﬁle σ is played. Let Ex(a)=
P
h ph(a)x
be the expected damage if a is the action proﬁle. p(a) completely describes the joint damage
function of the agents. This function is assumed to be non-separable, i.e. the expected
damage Ex(a) cannot be rewritten as the sum of individual damage functions.
li(xh) denotes the contribution owed by injurer i if damage xh is realized. Deﬁne a liability
rule as a function l(xh): X → IR











Thus, a liability rule is a vector determining a contingent contribution for each injurer i
and for each outcome xh. So far, a liability rule is nothing but a transfer mechanism. We
can safely ignore victims as agents in this model. Following standard practice in Law and
Economics, whenever victims can inﬂuence p(a), they will be incorporated as agents.
The timing can be represented as follows:
- Stage 1: a social planner proposes a liability rule l(xh) trying to maximize social welfare.
- Stage 2: action levels are chosen simultaneously by the injurers.
- Stage 3: the stochastic damage is realized and payments are made.
21The latter assumption excludes that an injurer could claim not having been involved in the accident at
all. Note that it would be diﬃcult to hold an injurer responsible if his participation in the accident cannot be
established. The assumption implies, in technical terms, that the standard individual rationality condition
familiar from agency theory can be left aside. Our results would become more restrictive if individual
rationality were a concern, as we show in a note which is available from the authors. Formal results on
individual rationality are also provided by Legros and Matsushima [1991].
22Mathematically, this is unimportant by the ﬁniteness of A and X.
9All agents are assumed to have VNM-utility functions which are quasi-linear in money.





where ui(ai)i sa( c o n c a v e )f u n c t i o nr e ﬂecting the direct utility from the care level, and
where vi(a) denotes i’s expected utility if the strategy proﬁle a is played. Analogously, vi(σ)
denotes i’s expected utility according to the mixed strategy proﬁle σ.
In Law and Economics, the use of social welfare functions with equal weights is standard.
Thus, social welfare is given by adding up individual utilities of injurers and victims (damages










i ui(ai) − Ex(a)
The desired allocation is ﬁrst best if a
∗ ∈ argmax
a W(a). A liability rule is eﬃcient if it
implements a ﬁrst best allocation as a subgame perfect equilibrium. A liability rule is non-
punitive if (i) each injurer pays a non-negative contribution, li(xh) ≥ 0 ∀i,∀xh, and if (ii)
P
ili(xh) ≤ xh, ∀xh. Note that this implies that no individual injurer and no subgroup pay
more than xh. A liability rule is strict if moreover the sum of contributions of the injurers
a d du pt ot h et o t a lh a r mxh,
P
i li(xh)=xh, ∀xh. Thus, a strict and non-punitive liability
rule is simply a division of xh among the injurers such that no injurer receives a subsidy.
Throughout, we restrict attention to strict liability rules in this sense.
3. Eﬃcient and non-punitive rules of strict liability
In order to state a concise condition for the existence of a non-punitive and strict liability
rule, it will be helpful to introduce the following deﬁnition of deviation n-tuples Ψ which are
sets of strategy proﬁles:
Definition 1: An n-tuple of strategy proﬁles Ψ is called a deviation n-tuple,i fi th a st h e
form: Ψ ≡ ((a∗
−i\σi))i∈N.
Ad e v i a t i o nn-tuple Ψ consists of n strategy proﬁles; each of these n strategy proﬁles is
assigned to one of the n players, on a one-for-one basis. In the strategy proﬁle assigned to
player i,a l lp l a y e r se x c e p ti choose their ﬁrst best care level. Agent i chooses a deviation
10t ot h ec a r el e v e lσi. In other words, a deviation n-tuple regroups a set of strategy proﬁles
such that exactly one agent deviates at a time, and a deviation is contained for every agent.
Note that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the set of mixed strategies M and
the set of deviation n-tuples.23 Abusing notation, we refer to M also as the set of deviation
n-tuples. Recall that p(σ) is the probability density function induced by σ ∈ M.
We present and interpret the ﬁr s tm a i nr e s u l to ft h i sp a p e r :
Proposition 1: There exists a strict liability rule which is non-punitive and eﬃcient if and
only if:













Proof: See the Appendix. 2
Condition (1) in words: for any deviation n-tuple, the sum of utility gains must be smaller
than the diﬀerence between the damage outcomes weighted with the maximum probability
induced by any of the deviations and the expected damage in equilibrium.
4. Interpretation and characterization
The ﬁrst subsection provides an intuition for the necessity part of the result. The intuition
for the suﬃciency part is more intricate and relegated to the next subsection. The last
subsection collects the insights on the characterization of eﬃcient liability rules.
4.1. Interpretation: necessity
As mentioned above, we now present an intuition for the necessity part of Condition (1).
Recall that there are inﬁnitely many deviation n-tuples Ψ and consider one arbitrarily chosen










This expression gives the expected increase in the liability payment of agent i if she deviates
from the ﬁrst best allocation to the speciﬁc mixed strategy σi included in Ψ and will there-
fore be called the punishment potential for agent i. A necessary condition to deter any given
23Recall that mixed strategies are only needed for the formal existence result; the eﬃcient allocation which
is implemented is in pure strategies.
11deviation is that the punishment potential induced by this deviation is at least as large as










li(xh)a st h eaggregate punishment potential for all agents. Ob-
viously, to deter each deviation included in Ψ, the aggregate punishment potential must at




To understand the necessity part, it is helpful to look ﬁrst at deviation n-tuples of a
speciﬁcs o r tw h i c hw ec a l lsymmetric simulations. A formal deﬁnition is as follows:
Definition 2: Ad e v i a t i o nn-tuple Ψ is called a symmetric simulation if ∀i,j ∈ N,a n df o r
all strategy proﬁles (a∗
−i\σi), (a∗
−j\σj) in Ψ, ph(a∗
−i\σi)=ph(a∗
−j\σj).
In plain words, a symmetric simulation describes deviations from the ﬁrst best allocation
for agents i and j (where i and j are chosen arbitrarily) such that each damage occurs with
exactly the same probability. That is to say, a symmetric simulation is a deviation n-tuple
where each of the n strategy proﬁles induces the same probability distribution function over
X. So with respect to symmetric simulations, all agents appear to be equally likely as having
deviated from the desired action level. There is no way that the court identiﬁes or excludes
a speciﬁc agent as the deviator, not even in stochastic terms.
Consider an example with only two injurers and three possible levels of harm, x0 =0 ,
x1 > 0a n dx2 > 0. A symmetric simulation means that the increases in the probabilities
for x1 and x2 are exactly the same if injurer 1 respectively injurer 2 deviates from the ﬁrst
best allocation to her mixed strategy included in Ψ.S oph(a∗
−1\σ1)=ph(a∗
−2\σ2) for both
levels of harm xh = x1 or xh = x2. This means that the aggregate punishment potential
is independent of the division of the damages. So nothing can be gained by an intelligent
division of x1 and x2 between the two injurers.
Thus, if Ψ is a symmetric simulation, if in other words the probability distribution func-




is identical for all agents. Therefore, for symmetric deviation n-tuples, Condition (1) can








∗) for arbitrary j. (2)
It is then clear that Proposition 1 deﬁnes in fact a necessary condition for the existence
of a non-punitive liability rule: to deter each individual agent, a punishment potential in
the amount of her utility gain is needed; aggregating over all agents leads to (2) for that
deviation n-tuple.
12Next, we consider deviation n-tuples Ψ which are not symmetric simulations. For our
example with two injurers, this means that the increase in the probabilities p1 for damage x1
and p2 for x2 are not identical if injurer 1 or 2 deviates to σi. Suppose that p1 (p2) is larger
if injurer 1 (2) deviates and that both damages are divided equally between the injurers.
The aggregate punishment potential can then be increased by raising li(x1) for injurer 1 and
li(x2) for injurer 2.
This is exactly the idea underlying Condition (1): Consider a deviation n-tuple where
the inequality (1) is just binding. The right hand side of the inequality can be called the
maximum punishment potential, as every damage is weighted with the maximum of the
probability diﬀerences that are induced by the deviation n-tuple.24 Obviously, the actual
aggregate punishment potential will have to be (weakly) smaller than the maximum punish-
ment potential as every agent will calculate the increase in her expected damages by using
the probability diﬀerences that she induces on her own. If inequality (1) is violated, then the
maximum punishment potential will be smaller than the aggregate utility gain, and there
must be at least one agent whose deviation is proﬁtable. Therefore, Proposition 1 states
a necessary condition. If there is a symmetric simulation, then conditions (1) and (2) are
identical, i.e. the maximum punishment potential and the aggregate punishment potential
are the same.
Note that our intuition for the necessity part does by no means imply suﬃciency since we
have not shown that a single liability rule can be found that is simultaneously good enough
for all possible deviation n-tuples (see section 4). The Appendix contains a formal proof
demonstrating that a non-punitive liability rule which implements the eﬃcient pure strategy
proﬁle a∗ exists in fact precisely when Condition (1) is satisﬁed.
4.2. Interpretation: suﬃciency
In this section, we propose a graphical intuition which helps to understand why condition
(1) is not only necessary, but also suﬃcient. The graphical approach should also help to
understand heuristically how to approach the characterization of eﬃcient rules in the next
subsection. In our graphical illustration, there are only two possible outcomes, the “low”
damage x1 and the “high” damage x2. Figure 1 depicts this situation. The expected damage
is precisely the plane connecting the monetary damage levels of each of the corners of this
24Given non-punitiveness, damages have a lower and an upper bound: 0 ≤ li(xh) ≤ xh, ∀i,xh.T h i s
implies that the maximum punishment potential is indeed identical to the maximum aggregate punishment
potential, which can be achieved only when those agents pay damages which achieve the maximum probability
diﬀerence. This relation does not hold when non-punitiveness is not required.
13graph: Ex = x2 if p2 = 1, etc. In our two-dimensional picture, this plane is the line
connecting x1 and x2.
It is convenient to imagine that agents choose directly induced probabilities rather than
actions. To understand what we mean by induced probabilities, recall that every strategy
proﬁle a induces a certain probability density function p(a). In our example of just two
outcomes, the probability distribution function p(a) can be completely represented with
just the probability p2 of outcome x2 to occur, since p1 =1− p2.T h u s , w e c a n i m a g i n e
that agents pick directly a probability value p2 rather than actions. In this sense, consider
ﬁrst the eﬃcient induced probability p2(a∗) induced by the ﬁr s tb e s ta l l o c a t i o na∗. Through
deviations, agent i can induce probabilities p2 = p2(a∗
−i\ai)w h e r eai ∈ Ai. For the remainder
of this section, we will stick to this convention of analyzing induced probabilities.
The essence of our explanation consists in comparing utility gains and increases in ex-
pected damage levels of individual deviations. Starting from the target allocation p2(a∗), we
can draw the individual utility gains associated with a deviation to p2. The fact that agents
can mix their strategies implies that the set of utility gains which are attainable from devi-
ations is convex. In other words, the frontier of attainable utility gains ui(p2)i sac o n c a v e
function over the range of p2 ∈ [0,1]. Adding up concave functions will again yield a concave
function. Hence the aggregate utility gain under any deviation proﬁle will be concave, too
(see
P
i ui in Figure 1).
[ insert Figure 1 about here.]
We consider ﬁrst the case of symmetric simulations. As explained above, condition (2)





is required. In terms of Figure 1, this means that the slope of the concave surface
P
i ui(p2)
must be smaller than the slope of the line Ex(p2).
The intuition can now be completed by showing that liability assignments li(p2)e x i s t
which deter every possible deviation p2 a n dw h i c hc a nb e“ ﬁnanced” out of the available
punishment potential Ex(p2). Such a liability assignment will be, in terms of our graphical
representation, a line connecting the individual liability shares li(x1)a n dli(x2). This is
depicted as the li(p2)-line in Figure 1.B yv i r t u eo ft h ec o n c a v i t yo ft h eui(p2)-curve, agent
i’s possible deviations are all successfully deterred as long as the li(p2)-line can be drawn as
non-intersecting to ui(p2). This is depicted in Figure 1 by the tangential line li(p2). Note
that the function of utility gains ui(p2) has a smaller slope in all directions (in other words,
it is decreasing faster and increasing less rapidly) than the li(p2)-line of punishments. Next,
one can draw the function of utility gains u2(p2) for agent 2 on top of the punishment plane
14l1(p2) of agent 1, as shown in Figure 2. The sum of the two functions l1(p2)a n du2(p2)
will again be concave. In that fashion, punishment planes li(p2) can be constructed in such
a way that the surfaces of utility gains of all successive agents are separated. If the right
li(p2)-planes are chosen, then the minimal slope of the punishment plane for the last agent
is given by the maximum of the aggregate utility gain, maxp2
P
iui(p2). The quintessential
point is the following: If the condition of Proposition 1 is met, then the slope of the sum
of these separating planes will be smaller than the slope of the Ex(p2)-plane of expected
damage.25
We turn next to the case where a symmetric simulation does not exist. This means that,
starting from the optimal allocation p2(a∗), we are now looking at directions of deviations
which are not feasible for all agents. In other words, p2(a∗) is not an interior point of the
set of probability distributions that all agents can induce. For at least some agents, it must
be a boundary point of their sets of deviations. Suppose now an increase of the induced
probability p2 is feasible for just a subset K ⊂ N of the agents. The available punishment
potential is given by the slope of the Ex(p2)-plane in the direction of an increase of p2.
If this slope is steeper than the aggregate utility gains of the agents in K (those who can
move in that direction), then li(p2)-planes can be found which deter anyone from inducing
an increase in p2 and whose slope adds to less than the slope of Ex(p2). Thus, the feasible




∗))] ≤ Ex(p2) − Ex(p2(a
∗)) (3)
Note that the summation is done only over those agents i w h i c ha r ec o n t a i n e di nt h es e t
K (i.e. those who can increase p2). Corresponding conditions can be formulated for all
directions of deviations.
Now look at any deviation n-tuple Ψ which is not a symmetric simulation. The pun-
ishment potential available to deter any of the deviations in Ψ depends on whether the
deviation in question induces a probability distribution which is a symmetric simulation or
not. If it is, then the punishment potential for this deviation is given by condition (2). If it
is not, then only those agents compete for the assignment of a positive share out of the losses
x2 which can actually increase p2. In the extreme case where no deviation is a symmetric
simulation, condition (1) states nothing else than that an eﬃcient rule exists as long as the
punishment potential for each deviation is suﬃcient to deter those who can actually produce
this deviation.
25The reader familiar with elementary topology will recognize a separation theorem behind our argument.
15[ insert Figure 2 about here.]
Now we can put the pieces together. Condition (1) states that the aggregate utility
gain of Ψ must be smaller than the weighted sum of outcomes xh,e a c hw e i g h t e dw i t ht h e
maximum induced probability in Ψ. So this statement combines our reasoning on symmetric
simulations and on absence of symmetric simulations in a joint statement. Recall that for
symmetric simulations, condition (1) collapses into (2). Otherwise, the induced probability
maxiph(a∗
−i\σi) determines the punishment potential. When does this give an aggregate
punishment potential which is actually higher than the one in condition (2)? This is only
the case if there are asymmetries among injurers, in the sense that a probability increase
cannot be induced by all injurers.
4.3. Characterization of the eﬃcient rule
What insights can be obtained for the characterization of eﬃcient liability rules that we
can derive from our interpretation? This question is of course of great importance for the
practitioner. While we cannot oﬀer a complete characterization of the eﬃcient rule within
the general framework of the model (this would require a parametric speciﬁcation of the
joint damage function), the interpretation provides some valuable insights.
T h ei m p o r t a n ti n s i g h ti st h a to n es h o u l dﬁrst test for the presence of symmetric simula-
tions. That is, one should ask whether, starting from the desired allocation a∗, all injurers
could have increased the probability of the actual accident xh or not. The symmetric sim-
ulation test is accepted if all of them could have done so. This is the case if, in the space
of induced probability distributions, moving into the direction of the actual accident is a
symmetric simulation. The insight for the actual form of the liability assignment is in this
case: apportion in such a way that individual contributions follow the marginal utilities in
the critical symmetric deviation n-tuple, i.e. the deviation n-tuple with minimal slackness
according to inequality (2).
The symmetric simulation test is rejected if increasing the induced probability of the
actual accident was not feasible for all injurers. In this case, it follows that those injurers who
cannot move into the direction of the actual accident should not pay any contributions. Only
those injurers who can increase the probability of the actual accident should pay damages.
To see why, recall that our interpretation hints that the result is best interpreted in terms
of induced probabilities: the necessary and suﬃcient condition is that for each change of
induced probabilities, the available punishment potential must be larger than the aggregate
16utility gain. But note that allocating the punishment potential exclusively to those injurers
who could have increased the probability of the actual accident is a suﬃcient deterrence.
A second remark refers to the actual calculation of the splitting rule. This remark is
more a caveat. One might be led to think that determining the corresponding minimum
punishment potential li(xh) that must be allotted to i in order to deter all those pure strategy
deviations that increase the probability of xh is suﬃcient. However, this depends in turn
on the splitting rule of other outcomes. Moreover, it must be certain that the li(xh)i sn o t
so big that it actually violates i’s incentive constraints against deviations which decrease
the induced probability of xh. So the calculation is not trivial and can in general not be
separated from those of other outcomes.
5. Limit ineﬃciency
There is an important implication of our results in section 3 concerning the number of
injurers. They imply a “limit ineﬃciency” result, meaning that the larger the economy, the
less likely it is that the mechanism yields eﬃciency.
We will argue informally, using a standard technique which is the technique of replicating
individuals. Consider condition (1). To demonstrate the limit ineﬃciency result in a simple
manner, assume that agents 1,...,n are replicated repeatedly. Obviously, while the left-hand
side of condition (1) grows proportionally in the number of replications, the right-hand side
remains constant. So, for any damage function, there must be a ﬁnite number of replications
where ineﬃciency is inevitable.
It follows that, in the presence of moral hazard, tort law can eﬃciently resolve environ-
mental problems only if the number of injurers is small or if the asymmetry among injurers
grows in proportion to their number. For global environmental problems like the depletion
of the atmosphere, which undoubtedly have elements of multiple causation and moral hazard
to them, liability rules are of little help, at least if unobservability of actions is a real concern.
6. Noisy monitoring
We have argued that allocations are much more likely to be implementable if lucrative de-
viations are stochastically identiﬁable. That begs for the following complementary analysis:
suppose the court can obtain additional information on the likely action levels that injur-
ers have chosen. For example, suppose an environmental agency requires that potentially
harmful emissions be monitored. Taken for granted that monitoring is imprecise, when is it
17nonetheless suﬃcient for a stochastic identiﬁcation of the injurers? How would the feasible
allocations improve, and how should the environmental agency monitor?
We describe the monitoring technology as follows. The monitoring technology delivers
a noisy signal θi on the care levels ai. The choice variable of the environmental agency is
t h eq u a l i t yb yw h i c hi’s action is monitored. We suppose that this quality is determined by
the expenditure ci on monitoring of i. We assume that the relationship between monitoring
expenditure and signal quality is monotonic. We can express the signal quality directly by
ci.L e tf(θi|ai,c i) denote the density of θi if ai is chosen and ci is the quality of monitoring.




i) is a mean-preserving spread of f(θi|ai,c 1
i). We assume that the distribution
of θi is independent from the distribution of xh, for a given action proﬁle a.A l s o , θi is
independently distributed from the signals obtained for other injurers, i.e. θi does only
depend on i’s action ai and on ci.
The vector θ =( θ1,...,θn) denotes the signal on all agents and c =( c1,...,cn)d e n o t e st h e
vector of qualities of observation for each agent. Let f(θ|a,c) denote the joint probability of
θ being the joint observation on all agents if a is the proﬁle of action levels and c is chosen.
Note that independence of the signals implies that f(θ|a,c)=Πif(θi|ai,c i). In particular,
if agent i deviates from the eﬃcient action level, then she will aﬀect only the probability of
the signal reporting on her own action choice, not those of other injurers: we can write
f(θ|a∗
−i\ai,c)=f(θi|ai,c i) · f(θ−i|a∗
−i,c −i).
The information available to the court is now a joint realization of xh and of the signal
θ; both are informative on the likely actions of injurers. The liability rule l(xh,θ) should
t h e r e f o r ed e p e n do nb o t ho u t c o m exh and signals θ. The timing of the model is now as
follows:
- Stage 1: the environmental agency chooses c and the court proposes a liability rule
l(xh,θ).
- Stage 2: action levels are chosen simultaneously by the injurers.
- Stage 3: the stochastic damage is realized.
- Stage 4: the monitoring signal θ is observed by the environmental agency and delivered
to the court.
- Stage 5: payments are made according to l(xh,θ).




ui(ai) − Ex(a) − c
Both the court and the environmental agency maximize social welfare. The optimal choice
of c and l(xh,θ) will then solve the following problem:
maxl(xh,θ),c W(a,c)=
P
i ui(ai) − Ex(a) − c
s.t. l(xh,θ) is strict and non-punitive
ai =a r gm a x ai{ui(ai) − E[li(xh,θ)]}
(4)
We should add that our result below would not change if decision-making of the environ-
mental agency and the court were sequential rather than simultaneous; nor does it matter
which of the two institutions decides ﬁrst. Suppose then that monitoring level c and liability
rule l(xh,θ) are chosen so as to maximize problem (4). We denote the optimal monitor-
ing level by c∗. Our result demonstrates the condition under which the solution will be an
eﬃcient liability rule (i.e. it implements a∗,t h ee ﬃcient allocation deﬁn e di nS e c t i o n2 ) :
Proposition 2: The liability rule will be eﬃcient if and only if the signal quality c∗ is

















is satisﬁed for all deviation n-tuples Ψ ∈ M.
Proof: See the Appendix. 2
Thus, an eﬃcient liability rule will only exist if monitoring is suﬃciently informative at the
optimal level of monitoring expenditure. Condition (5) says that the maximum punishment
potential is now given by a weighted sum of accident losses where each outcome is weighted
with the maximum probability that the joint realization of θ and xh has been generated by
a deviation contained in the deviation n-tuple under consideration.
An important aspect of this result is that the optimal monitoring policy and the choice
of the liability rule are interdependent: the expenditure of the environmental agency should
also reﬂect how the monitoring results can be used in court; i.e. the optimal monitoring
policy must reﬂect that the court is restricted to use non-punitive liability rules.
19In a loose sense, one can motivate the result as a variation on the old Beckerian theme of
optimal punishment which suggests that the optimal policy for a costly auditing technology
would be to minimize the number of audits and to maximize the punishment in case a
deviation is detected.
To provide an intuition, it is easiest to directly follow up on the intuition proposed in
section 4. Recall that the liability rule l(xh,θ) can depend on all components. If there is
monitoring, then the court has a description on the outcome state comprising x and θi (the
signal of the agent i who is monitored). Whatever the informational precision of the signals,
we can rewrite the incentive inequalities in terms of this extended state space (xh,θ). Each
agent has only an impact on the distribution of the signal concerning her action, not the
signal for the others (recall that the mean of the signals is always the true care level). It
follows that there are no symmetric simulations over the extended outcome space (xh,θ).
The trouble is that the no punitive damages condition puts a cap on the maximal available
punishment. In fact, the condition of no punitive damages has quite a bit of bite in this
context. If there were no cap on punishments, then just excluding symmetric simulations
over the extended state space (xh,θ) is enough to restore eﬃciency. To illustrate this point,
we investigate, as a pure thought experiment, the optimal liability rule if the no punitive
damages condition were not a concern. The court could then levy more than xh on any
subgroup of injurers. Suppose that ci is the minimum level of monitoring such that a signal
θi is obtained whose distribution changes continuously in the choice of action ai. Suppose that
just a single agent is monitored at minimal precision ci.L e tc ≡ mini∈N c(0,...,0,c i,0,...,0) >
0 denote the lowest possible expenditure at which monitoring of a single injurer is possible.
Then there always exists an eﬃcient liability rule:
Proposition 3: There always exists an eﬃcient liability rule satisfying
P
i∈N li(xh)=xh
(but not necessarily satisfying no punitive damages) where the environmental agency will
spend not more than the minimum c on monitoring.
Proof: See the Appendix. 2
Proposition 3 analyzes a liability rule which collects just the harm xh. Nevertheless,
this is not a realistic rule since li < 0 is not excluded, i.e. some injurers could eﬀectively
receive a subsidy in the event of an accident. Still, it is instructive as it shows that the scope
of endogenous information acquisition is restricted by the no punitive damages condition.
Minimal monitoring is suﬃcient if punitive damages can be levied because it delivers enough
additional information so that no deviation proﬁle is a symmetric simulation any more.
20But no punitive damages is the relevant case, as we argued in the introduction. In this
case, the li(xh,θ)-planes cannot assume arbitrarily steep slopes. Therefore, signals must
be suﬃciently informative. Still, the way the maximum punishment potential reacts to
the change in the action level of an injurer can now depend on the expected variation in
the extended state space (xh,θ). If signals are informative enough so that the maximum
punishment potential is larger than the aggregate utility gain of a deviation n-tuple, an
eﬃcient liability rule can be found.
7. Conclusion
For practitioners of environmental liability, multi-party accidents coupled with unobservable
(or insuﬃciently observable) care levels of the injurers are a frequent problem. This setting
was analyzed. We showed that the problem is related to the theory of team production. We
investigated the existence of eﬃcient non-punitive and strict liability rules when deviators
can be stochastically identiﬁed. No punitive damages can be reconciled with eﬃciency only
if agents are very asymmetric. One can summarize: if deviations cannot be identiﬁed in
stochastic terms, no punitive damages imposes a severe restriction on the possibility that
tort law is an eﬃcient remedy for multi-party accidents with moral hazard. Also, the larger
the number of injurers, the less powerful an instrument is tort. By virtue of the conditions
necessary, there is no hope that future research would ﬁnd more favorable results.
There are, however, remedies beyond resorting to punitive damages. We showed that even
a noisy monitoring technology can restore unconstrained eﬃciency if it delivers additional
injurer-speciﬁc information of suﬃcient precision. In a companion paper (Feess and Hege
[1996]), we analyze another remedy: intermediaries can potentially improve the situation
because their dealings with injurers are not subject to no punitive damages. In the liability
context, the role of the intermediary is naturally assumed by insurance companies. We show
that observability of insurance contracts is suﬃcient to obtain an eﬃcient allocation.
21Appendix
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 :
The proof proceeds in four steps: In Step 1, the incentive constraints for the liability
rule being an equilibrium are deﬁned. In Step 2, the restrictions of non-punitiveness and
strict liability are added and all conditions are put together in matrix form. In Step 3, the
Theorem of the Alternatives is used to derive the existence conditions with respect to mixed
strategies and deviation n-tuples Ψ. Step 4 demonstrates that the conditions derived are in
fact identical with Proposition 1.
























≥ ui(ai) − ui(a
∗
i) ∀i, ∀ai (A.2)
System (A.1) deﬁnes the incentive compatibility constraints for all injurers. As a ﬁrst
step towards the matrix representation of the system of constraints, we deﬁne Pi as the







So Pi is a matrix that incorporates the probability diﬀerences for each damage and each
action ai,g i v e na∗


























So the incentive compatibility constraints for all actions of agent i can be written as
Pili ≥ ui
22Recall that the complete system of constraints must also include non-punitiveness and strict
liability. To take into account strict liability (total liability payments must add up to total
losses), we deﬁne the liability payments of an arbitrarily chosen injurer j as the diﬀerence
















≥ uj(aj) − uj(a
∗
j) ∀aj (A.4)
Recall that xh −
P
i6=j li(xh) is the liability payment of injurer j if damage xh occurs.
Step 2: Now let P be the following
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P1 0 ··· ··· ··· ··· ··· 0
0 P2 0
. . . ... . . .
0 Pj−1 0
−Pj −Pj ··· −Pj −Pj ··· −Pj −Pj
0 Pj+1 0
. . . ... . . .
0 Pn−1 0




















P includes the probability diﬀerences Pi(j,h)=ph(a∗
−i\ai) − ph(a∗) for all injurers and
all strategies. Note that the entry for injurer j guarantees that the sum of liability payments
add up to total harm. However, non-punitiveness not only requires that
P
i li(xh)=xh for
all possible outcomes but also that no injurer be subsidized. In order to rewrite the complete
system of constraints (including incentive compatibility, non-punitiveness and strict liability)
































where I denotes the identity matrix. Next, (still needed for the matrix representation)
similar deﬁnitions are made for the possible damage outcomes and the vectors of utility













We deﬁne u as the
P

















































We are now in a position to write all constraints in matrix form. A non-punitive, strict and




So P0l ≥ u0 is nothing but a short-cut version of all constraints. Note that the top part
Pl ≥ u ensures incentive compatibility and the summing constraint imposed by strict liabil-





excludes subsidies and thus ensures non-punitiveness.
24Step 3: The matrix form (A.4) permits a direct application of the following result on the
existence of solutions in systems of linear inequalities (known for example as the Theorem
of Fan [1956] or the Theorem of the Alternatives):
Lemma 1: T h e o r e mo ft h eA l t e r n a t i v e s( F a n ) :
Let P be a m × n-matrix, u ∈ IR
m. Then one and only one of the following alternatives
holds:
1. ∃l ∈ IR
n s.t. P · l ≥ u
2. ∃λ ∈ IR
M
+ s.t. λ · P =0and λu>0.
The following deﬁnition will be used: Let A = {α |αP0 =0 }.T h e n α0 ∈ A is called a
critical condition w.r.t. A if α0u ≤ 0 ⇒ αu ≤ 0 ∀α ∈ A.
Lemma 1 implies that: ∃l ∈ IR
(n−1)l s.t. P0l0 ≥ u0 if and only if: 6 ∃λ s.t. λP0 =0a n d
λu0 > 0. If λ = 0 then the condition is satisﬁed trivially. For any λ 6=0 ,l e tλ(ai)b et h e




λ(ai). Let α = 1
zλ.N o t et h a tz ≥ 0,
α ≥ 0. Hence for any P0, u0:
λP
0 =0 a n d λu
0 > 0 ⇔ αP
0 =0 a n d αu
0 > 0.































































,i =1 ,..,n (A.8)
We add the following notation: Let α(ai)=1










ai∈Ai α(ai). Note that 0 ≤ ρi ≤ 1, ∀i, j .L e t σi = αi +( 1− ρi)a∗
i,a n dl e t
σ =( σ1,...,σn).
25Note that σ ∈ IR
P
i Ti
+ ,a n d
P
ai σi(αi)=1 ,∀i. Hence σ can be interpreted as a vector of
mixed strategies. Next, note that αiPi = σiPi − (1 − ρi)a∗
iPi = σiPi,a sa∗
iPi =0 .H e n c e ,
we can without loss of generality normalize α to the mixed strategy σ in the partition of α0.
Using this replacement, (B) and (C) can be rewritten as:












gj(xh)xh − σjPjx ≤ 0. (C0)
Now the LHS of (C’) is maximized when gj(xh) is minimized. Hence the α0 which incorporates
the minimal gj(xh) corresponds to the critical condition. Note that, as in Proposition 2, for
any n-tuple of αi’s, there are always non-negative numbers gi(xh), i ∈ N, s.t. (B’) is satisﬁed.





−j\σj) ∀i 6= j, ∀xh ∈ X. (A.9)






−j\σj) ∀xh ∈ X. (A.10)
Plugging (A.10) into (C’) gives condition (1). 2
Proof of Proposition 2 : The technique of this proof follows closely the proof of Propo-
sition 1. We will outline only the major steps, the remainder follows by analogy. Let
µθ,h(a,c)=f(θ|a,c) · ph(a) be the joint probability of the observation (xh,θ) conditional on






∗,c)( A . 1 1 )
Thus, Hi contains Ti lines and a diﬀerent column for each possible observation (θ,h). Let H
and H0 be deﬁned in analogy to P in (A.5) and P0 in (A.6), respectively. Then any ˆ l such
that:
H
0ˆ l ≥ u
0
will be an non-punitive, strict and eﬃcient liability rule. We ﬁnish the proof by showing:
6 ∃ˆ α s.t. (D) ˆ αH0 =0a n d( E )ˆ αu0 > 0. The vector ˆ α can be partitioned as α0 in (A.8), as
both vectors are of equal length. Denote the support of θ by Θ. Then, in analogy to (B’)
26and (C’), conditions (D) and (E) can be rewritten as:












gj(xh)xh − σjPjx ≤ 0. (E0)







−j\σj,c) ∀(xh,θ) ∈ X × Θ (A.12)













−j\σj,c)]xh − σjPjx ≤ 0. (A.13)
Now use the fact that µθ,h(a,c)=Πif(θi|ai,c i) · ph(a) by the stochastic independence of
ph(a)a n df(θ|a,c). Plugging into (A.13) gives condition (5). 2
Proof of Proposition 3 : The proof is by construction. Recall that l(xh,θi) can depend
on all components of x and θi. (We have only a signal θi o nt h es i n g l ei n j u r e ri who is
monitored). To obtain the desired liability rule, construct ﬁrst a function g(θi,c i)f o re a c hi
and ci such that
a
∗
i =a r gm a x
ai
½
ui(ai) − (n − 1)
·Z





Consider the following liability rule. For all agents except i, the liability rule will be
lj(x,θi)=x − g(θi,c i). The liability rule for agent i will be li(x,θi)=( n − 1)g(θi,c i) −
(n − 2)x. To demonstrate balancedness, note that summing up shows that
P
i li(x,θi)=x.
To demonstrate eﬃciency, recall that for agent i,t h ee ﬃcient action a∗
i is implemented by
construction. Next, note that for agents j 6= i, the allocation a∗ is implemented because
g(·) is independent of their action; thus, the variable part of their liability shares is x which
obviously leads to the eﬃcient choice.
We will next show that the function g(θi,c i) will always exist, i.e. for any level of
information ci.T os e et h i s ,c o n s i d e ra n yg0(θi,c i)s u c ht h a tg0(θi,c i)·f(θi|ai,c i) is minimized
for ai = a∗
i. Clearly g0(·) exists because f(θi|ai,c i) changes continuously in ai. Suppose
g0(θi,c i) would not satisfy the incentive inequalities underlying condition (A.14). But then
take any multiple y of g0(θi,c i). Because there are no bounds for admissible liability rules,
there is no limit on y.T h u s , y<∞ must exist satisfying conditions (A.14). It follows
27that it suﬃces to have any signal θi at hand, regardless of the precision and the number of
monitored agents. But then the claim that the minimal choice of monitoring inputs must be
optimal is immediate. 2
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